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jurisdiction. In order to discourage avoidance of this tax by purchase from
an out-of-state source, such a system should also include a tax on the in-state
use of all personal property, with a deduction allowed to the extent that the
property has already been taxed under the gross receipts provision or under
a sales levy in the state of origin of the goods. °° States have not readily
resorted to this system because of administrative difficulties inherent in a
determination of a fair apportionment in each case, but have generally pre-
ferred levies on retail sales of personalty. 1° 1 Judicial adherence to old com-
merce concepts has insulated the interstate merchant from application of this
type of statute, and has resulted in depletion of state revenues and harass-
ment of local merchants. The Supreme Court's most recent decisions in this
field seem to have created a method whereby interstate transactions that
have hitherto escaped retail sales taxation entirely may be reached by one
of the interested states. The newly articulated double taxation test, with the
aid of the due process limitation upon extraterritorial taxation, may in the
future be invoked to breathe life into Justice Holmes' mandate that "inter-
state commerce must pay its way."
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND EXCLUSIVE BROADCASTS
OF SPORTING EVENTS
A LEGAL system developed to meet the needs of less complex eras must
often prove inadequate to cope with the problems incident to the immense
potentialities of modern technology. When such issues arise, the judiciary
is faced with the choice of stretching old maxims beyond all recognition, or
of adopting a more flexible instrument, based on a sound grasp of the prob-
lerms of policy involved. Such a choice has been precipitated by the mush-
room growth of radio. The practicability of broadcasting news events while
they are still in progress has been largely responsible for the present un-
paralleled public interest in outdoor sporting events. The willingness of
commercial sponsors to pay well for the exclusive right to capitalize on this
interest has made the preservation of sole control of broadcasts from athletic
parks and stadia a matter of extreme importance to their owners. To pro-
tect this valuable commercial interest old theories of property, trespass, and
nuisance are wholly inadequate. An equitable solution can be attained by the
courts only through an extension of the flexible doctrine of unfair compe-
tition.
The growth of the law of unfair competition represents a struggle to
attain a mean between the conflicting doctrines of monopoly and laissez-
99. See note 12, supra.
100. See, e.g., Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, § 32(c).
101. See, e.g., CALIF. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8493.
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faire.1 In the early period of revitalized trading which followed the Indus-
trial Revolution, the reaction from monopoly was so violent that outright
malice vwas virtually the only available ground for equitable restraint of
competitive practices. 2 The law of trade-marks at length imposed a partial
limitation on trade piracy.3 This limitation was later broadened to include
any attempt, by copying the label, appearance, or name of commercial goods,
to pass off a rival's product as one's own, and so get the benefit of his estab-
lished reputation and good will.4 This was an important advance, but the
courts at first threatened to thNwart further progress by unduly restricting
relief to cases containing the elements both of public deception and of direct
financial damage.5 Such a rule placed too great an emphasis on the factual
probability of immediate loss of sales. It refused to recognize an injury unless
the stolen trade-name was applied to goods of the same sort, sold in the same
region, and to the same class of customer as the complainant's.0 Realizing
that realms of possible expansion are sharply curtailed if competitors are
free to use the trade name in all but the already occupied sphere of activity,
courts gradually reduced preemption of this sort by forbidding merchants to
apply the established trade names of others to similar, or related goods.7
1. See Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 Yu.E L 3. 1;
Jones, Historical Development of the Lau' of Business Competition (1926) 35 YALE L J.
905, (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 42, 207, 351.
2. Mogul Steamship Co., Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q. B. D. 593 (1839).
Malice is still always a ground for unfair competition relief. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373 (1911) (malicious wrong to induce breach of contract);
Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909) (establishing barber shop for the
purpose of injuring rival enjoined). See Haines, su pra note 1, at 6.
3. As late as 1742 English courts of equity refused to enjoin infringement of trade-
marks. Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (Ch. 1742). In 1838, however, an injunction was
granted even in the absence of proof of fraudulent intent. Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. &
C. 338 (Ch. 1838).
4. See Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 412 (1916); Glenn, Pre-
enption in Connection with Unfair Trade (1919) 19 CoL. L. Rv. 29; Rogers, Unfair
Competition (1919) 17 MicH. L. REv. 490; Comment (1913) 26 HARv. L. RE,. 442.
5. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (C. C. A. 6th,
1900) ; Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925);
McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 Iow. L REv. 274.
6. Hanover Star Mfilling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916) (plaintiff and de-
fendant in different geographical territories) ; Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Con-
densed filk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) (different non-competing products
so no deprivation of sales) ; Charles Broadway Rouss, Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 Fed.
706 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) (defendant sold complained of product to a limited clientele of
specialized interests so held no harmful competition) ; Borthwick . The Evening Post,
37 Ch. D. 449 (1888) (morning paper held not damaged by use of its name on evening
paper). See Oates, Relief in Equity Against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-Competitors
(1931) 25 ILL. L. REv. 643; Comment (1913) 26 H.uv. L. REv. 442.
7. Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) (cigar
manufacturer enjoined from using name of drug store on product not yet handled, on
the ground of preemption before actual use) ; Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.,
247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) (manufacturers of syrup enjoined from using name of
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The more liberal cases abandon the pretext of the "related goods" doctrine
and extend protection quite apart from threatened competition or even
fraud ;8 for the value of a trade-name lies in its exclusive connotation of a
particular line of goods. The decreasing emphasis on immediate competition
was paralleled by a gradual relaxation of the rigid requirement of deception.
Under the "related goods" doctrine, for example, there need be neither
fraudulent intent nor public deception. ° All that is required is an actual
misrepresentation the natural result of which is to deceive the consumer. As
the doctrine was more liberally applied to increasingly dissimilar goods, the
likelihood of deception grew progressively smaller; and tinder the most ad-
vanced cases, which protect a name for the sole purpose of preventing a loss
of its exclusive quality, deception may be absent altogether.' 0 This minimi-
zation of the importance of deception is not confined to trade-name cases.
Under the liberal view, as is illustrated by the famous case of International
News Service v. Associated Press," the essence of the wrong of unfair com-
petition is frequently not misrepresentation but misappropriation.' 2 Decep-
tion is but a means of gaining the wrongful end, and an element of the broad-
er damage, though often it is an important element in a particular case. 13
Because fraud is in many cases an invalid explanation of the granting of
equitable relief on the ground of unfair competition,' 4 some judges, search-
ing for a more comprehensive criterion by which to limit the new extensions
flour manufacturer). See Glenn, Preemption in Connection with Unfair Trade (1919)
19 CoL. L. REv. 29.
8. Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 262 Ky. 567, 90 S. W.
(2d) 1041 (1936), (1937) 25 Ky. L. J. 280.
9. The earlier cases required actual fraudulent intent. Coats v. Merrick Thread
Co., 149 U. S. 562 (1893) ; Lawrence v. Tennessee Co., 138 U. S. 537 (1891) (general re-
quirement of deceitful representation or perfidious dealing). More recently, even where
passing off is required, a plausible misrepresentation likely to mislead the consumer has
been ruled sufficient. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877) ; Coca Cola Co. v. Koke
Co. of America, 254 U. S. 143 (1920) ; (1931) 7 VA. L. REv. 481.
10. See note 8, supra.
11. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918) (Inter-
national News enjoined from copying news from the bulletin boards and early editions
of the Associated Press subscribers).
12. Id. at 242.
13. See Comment (1933) 46 HARV. L. Rev. 1171, 1173. Some jurists think fraudulent
means the very basis of the doctrine. See International News Service v. Assoeiated
Press, 248 U. S. 215, 248 (1918) (Justice Brandeis dissenting). Deception is perhaps of
particular value in cases where, because of the availability of copyright or patent, or the
expiration of the statutory period, courts are especially hesitant in granting protection,
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169 (1896) (name protected, after expira-
tion of statutory period, from deception).
14. It cannot, of course, explain the granting of relief in cases where no deceit was
present. Conversely, the presence of fraud usually results in no relief in cases involving
business schemes. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506
(1892) (new system for soliciting insurance); Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64
At. 436 (1906) (plan for co-ordinating white lead industries).
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of the doctrine, -have settled upon the term "unfairness."1  But on the whole,
courts preferring language ith a greater appearance of substantive mean-
ing have taken as their guide the traditional concept that equity protects
property rights only.16 Hoary rules devised to protect material possessions
have been extended in order to safeguard less tangible interests today re-
garded as valuable. Letters, lectures, pictures, plays, trade secrets, news,
business systems and business reputations have been clothed in the protective
mantle of "property."'17 That equity should grant this protection is eminently
just and necessary. To pilfer a man's painfully developed good will is as
surely theft as to steal his car or his dog, and involves a far greater loss of
personal and economic values. But the use, in this connection, of the term
property, so vague and many sided, so redolent of old common law rights
unrelated to present day trade relational interests,'8 is perhaps unfortunate.
The inherent judicial tendency to attempt the solution of all new problems
by the use of traditional phraseology"1  may be justified in terms of meta-
physical legal logic; but, in actual practice, it leads to considerable confusion
of issues.20
Furthermore, property, in this new sense, is a dangerously broad concept;
it tends to become virtually a synonym for value.2 ' And to protect some-
thing merely because it is valuable is to indulge in a meaningless circularity
of reasoning. Property in this sense follows, and does not lead the law.-
That a trade-mark is valuable is the result, not the cause of its support by
the courts. Financial loss and destructive competition are not in themselves
grounds for relief ;23 they are, indeed, to some extent necessary incidents to
15. See Steiff v. Bing, 215 Fed. 204, 206 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) ("Unfair competition
consists in selling goods by means which shock judicial sensibilities"); NIMs, U:NF,;n
COPETnTION AND TRAD MARKs (3d ed. 1929) § 9-a (basis of the doctrine is the accepted
community standard of fair play).
16. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Sw-ans. 402 (Ch., 1818). For list of cases discussing prop-
erty right as basis for equitable jurisdiction see Note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 295.
17. E.g., Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326 (18,7) (lectures); Reed v. Carter, 263
Ky. 1, 103 S. NV. (2d) 663 (1937).
18. Green, The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 ILL L. Ray. 237, 238 ("property" should
be confined to tangible things, not applied to relational interests, however valuable).
19. See note 16, supra.
20. See Comment (1919) 19 CoL. L. Rm 233, 238 (the "chameleon test of prop-
erty" leads in unfair competition cases to "harrowing and metaphysical questions").
21. See Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 Fed. 244, 243 (C. C. A.
2d, 1917) ("property" covers all exchangeable values); NoYEs, IxsTiTumrO:. OF Pnor-
saTY (1936) 346 (standard of exchangeable value).
1 22. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 LT. S. 215, 246 (1918)
(Holmes' separate opinion states that property is the creation of the law, and does nrt
arise from exchangeable value) ; Victoria Park Racing Co., Ltd. v. Taylor, 37 N. S. W.
322, 342 (1936) ("sic utere tuo" mere "benevolent yearning" unless altered to conclude
so as not "to infringe upon another's right") ; Cohen, Transcendental ,N\onscnso and the
Functional Approach (1935) 35 COL L. R v. 809, 815.
23. See National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, 24 F. Supp. 48S, 4S9 (S. D. N. Y.
1936) (damage without violation of a right creates no cause of action) ; Keeble v. Hid:-
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the free struggle which our system recog'nizes as productive of progress. It
is, therefore, vital that the courts pierce this veil of legal phrases, and give
careful consideration to the underlying questions of policy which are the
ultimate bases24 of decisions in unfair competition cases. It is only when
these questions have been resolved in favor of the erection of an equitable
right to protection that this right can accurately be termed property.
A determination of the advisability of protecting intangible trade values
involves a resolution of conflicting public policies. While a grant of exclusive
enjoyment benefits the entrepreneur, it may also burden the public with the
creation of a monopoly. Though the concepts of a profit system of economy
dictate encouragement of initiative by protection of its fruits, still it must
be remembered that the current availability of new ideas is an important
stimulus to progress. Consequently it is generally held on grounds of public
policy that business schemes, mere ideas not yet reduced to practice, are not
subject to protection. The possessor is left to safeguard himself as best he
can by secrecy or specific contract, 2 5 and in certain situations even fraud is
no ground of relief.2 6 It would seem that if the obvious difficulties of proof
of ownership could be overcome, 27 public interest might be forwarded by
protecting the propounder of new and useful ideas at least from preemption
by all types of fraud.28
Where the courts do admit the existence of a right to exclusive enjoyment,
there remains the question of the scope of that right. Courts must determine
the boundaries that fix the point at which private property is merged in the
eringill, 11 East. 574, 576 (K. B. 1809) (decreasing profits of an established occupation
not in itself an actionable injury) ; Paton, Broadcasting and Privacy (1938) 16 CAN. B.
REv. 425, 436 (financial loss alone insufficient for relief).
24. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S, 215, 246, 248
(1918).
25. See Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 132 N. Y. 264, 267, 30 N. E.
506, 507 (1892). Contract is apparently the only successful theory of recovery in this
class of case. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E. 206
(1935) (recovery of the reasonable value of an advertising scheme suggested by
plaintiff, on theory of acceptance of plaintiff's offer); (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1269. Of
course, the suggested scheme must even under this theory be novel enough to be of value
to the recipient. Id. at 1271.
26. Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 Atl. 436 (1906) (plan for co-ordination
of the lead industry); Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 132 N. Y. 264, 30
N. E. 506 (1892) (new system of soliciting insurance).
27. See (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1269, 1270, 1272.
28. The denial of protection probably stems from common law conservatism 'whlch
hesitates to recognize property in unsupported intangibles. See Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr.
2303, 2361 (K. B. 1769). Similarly ideas in copyrighted works may be freely used
[Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1879) (novel system of bookkeeping)], but only if the
taker employ an individual treatment, not merely colorable variations [Nutt v. National
Institute, Inc., For the Improvement of Memory, 31 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1029)].
But protection from deceptive means is afforded at common law when an idea has enough
tangible support to be rated a trade secret. See note 30, infra. The ephemeral nature
of the line between ideas and trade secrets is illustrated by Montegut v. Hickson, Inc.,
178 App. Div. 94, 164 N. Y. Supp. 858 (1st Dep't 1917).
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public domain. These boundaries vary in each case and class of cases accord-
ing to the balance between the closeness of association of the right with its
possessor, and its general utility to the public. Some property, if available
to competitors, would be valuable per sc, a useful tool in its own right. This
type of intangible possession consists more of content, of idea or fact, than
of form, and so is at once more widely useful, and less closely associated
with its owner. A trade secret29 is a possession of this type. Because of its
widespread potential value, its use by another is permitted if its discovery
resulted from independent investigation and analysis; but because of its
association, through the outlay of thought and money, with its owner, it is
protected from use following discovery by fraudulent means.30 Some intan-
gible property, on the other hand, is of value not because of any possibility
of functional use in a rival's business, but purely by virtue of those attributes
which serve to associate it with its owner. Thus a trade mark, symbolic of
trade good will, gains its value from secondary associations with a certain
business. To copy it serves no end except to profit by the actual fruits of a
competitor's efforts, and such theft is therefore enjoinable regardless of the
means employed.3 ' The value of literary property also lies in its originality
of form, of personal expression, and. such property, unlike a trade secret, is
protected from discovery and use by another.32 Its exclusive possession is
lost only by abandonment by the owner through publication, which is con-
sidered a dedication to the public. 33 Under the usual statement that intent
is the criterion of abandonment, the owner himself may determine the e.tent
of dedication. Publication for certain purposes, or to a certain class of people
only, does not result in the loss of exclusive possession for other purposes,
or against other classes.34
29.- A trade secret has been defined as "an idea, Imomn only to a few, which is re-
duced to practice in such manner that it is, or can very readily be made, a source of
profit in a trade or business." See Comment (1928) 42 HAmv. L_ r,. 254, n. 1.
30. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373, 402 (1911) ; Tabor V.
Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 36, 23 N. E. 12, 13 (1889). The same doctrine is supported by
the "ticker" cases, which hold that others may collect the specific information plaintiffs
are seeking to protect, but may not by unfair means pilfer the already collected facts.
See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 250 (1905); F. NV.
Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 183 Mass. 62, 64, 66 N. E. 204, 205 (1903);
Kiernan v. 'Manhattan Quotation Telegraph Co., 50 How. Pr. 194, 196 (N. Y. 1876).
31. See Hueblein v. Adams, 125 Fed. 782, 785 (C. C. Mass. 1903); ci. Marvel Co.
v. Pearl, 133 Fed. 160, 162 (C. C. A. 7d, 1904) (copying non-functional parts of ma-
chinery); Lectro-Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 19 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Conn.
1937).
32. An author has an exclusive right to his creation until he voluntarily parts with
it. See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); Palmer v.
DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 536 (1872).
33. After voluntary abandonment through publication, copyright replaces all common
law rights, and if the author has failed to take out copyright, he loses all rights. See
Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 36 (1882).
34. This is the doctrine of limited, as against general publication. It depends on the
imposing of restrictions, express or implied, on the extent of use granted to the public.
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The court in the News case,8 noted above as the keystone of the liberal
unfair competition doctrine, faced a delicate problem in the application of
these rules to news items. News cannot be classified either as a trade secret,
where content is paramount, or as literary property, the value of which lies
in form. It consists not in facts, for these are open to anyone who can find
them, but in their painstaking collection and correlation; not in literary ex-
pression, but in a prompt straightforward publication of events of current
interest.3 6 As a result, the protection afforded by copyright to published
literary works is legally unavailable ;3 and the principle forbidding fraudu-
lent discovery of trade secrets is inapplicable to a situation in which secrecy
is an impossibility. 8s Yet protection is demanded not only by the equities of
the situation, but also by public need.3 9 Without such protection it is quite
possible that large news gathering organizations would be virtually forced to
dissolve, depriving the public of a valuable service.4°
The court solved the problem by an extension of the doctrine of limited
publication.41 Since, in news reports, the competitor is appropriating not
tools to be utilized in his own efforts, but the very source of profit, the fin-
ished product of a whole business enterprise, absolute protection is appro-
priate unless exclusive possession has been abandoned by dedication. 42 In
terms of intent, publication in early editions is a release of all rights as
against an ordinary use by the general public, but abandons none of the
privilege of exclusive use of the news as material for commercial profit. In
that sense it is still property for so long as it retains commercial value. Since
in the case of news that period is not a long one,43 the rule of the News case
See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); Aronson v.
Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 369, 12 Atl. 177, 180 (Ch. 1887); Waring v. W. D. A. S.
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 443, 194 Atl. 631, 636 (1937) ; ef. M Dcarmott
Commission Co. v. Board of Trade, 146 Fed. 961, 964 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906). But see
Jewelers' Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241,
248, 49 N. E. 872, 874 (1898) ; Larrowe-Loisette v. O'Loughlin, 88 Fed. 896, 898 (C, C.
S. D. N. Y. 1898).
35. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
36. Thayer, Legal Rights for News (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 17.
37. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 234 (1918),
National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294, 298 (C. C. A. 7th,
1902); NIm!s, UNFAIR COINIPETITION AND TRADn MARRS (3d ed. 1929) 739.
38. See Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 Fed. 244, 250 (C, C, A.
2d, 1917); Comment (1930) 14 MINN. L. Rrv. 537, 543.
39. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 240 (1918).
40. See National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294, 296 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1902).
41. See note 34, supra.
42. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 236, 240
(1918) ; National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294, 299 (C. C. A.
7th, 1902) ; Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951, 960 (C. C. E. D. N. Y., 1909).
43. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 251 (1905)
("A priority of a few minutes probably is enough") ; International News Service v. As-
sociated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 245 (1918) (for so long as the news has commercial
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achieves a nice balance of equities. It grants a brief commercial monopoly,
which encourages the useful enterprise of news collection, without depriving
the public of reasonably rapid access to news. Minimizing the importance of
the elements of fraudulent or deceptive means of misappropriation, the court
rested its decision squarely on the true bases of the doctrine of unfair com-
petition. The old requirement that the appropriated property be used in direct
competition with its offended creator was reasserted;44 but, perhaps, only
because the central theory of the case was that as to all non-competitors the
very nature of the business required abandonment of all rights.
There has been a tendency to limit the liberal rule of the News decision
to cases directly involving news dissemination, and to reaffirm the former
criterion of deception in other situations. In the absence of the use of decep-
tive means of appropriation, protection has been denied dress designs.5 The
case which gave impetus to this trend4 may have turned on the availability
of patent protection,47 or the lack of originality in the design, but, neverthe-
less, it seems to represent an unfortunate retrogression to a seemingly dis-
carded dogma in these dress design cases.4s
The continued refusal of protection to advertising schemes 40 on the other
hand, is perfectly orthodox under existing law. Ideas are generally denied
value) ; National Tel. News Co. v. Westem Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294, 295 (C. C. A.
7th, 1902) (until sixty minutes after the items are printed).
44. See Oates, supra note 6, at 651.
45. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Monte-
gut v. Hickson, 178 App. Div. 94, 164 N. Y. Supp. 858 (1st Dep't 1917). The latter
case ruled that dress designs could not be obtained by fraudulently posing as a customer.
This ruling follows the well established rule for trade secrets, also followed in the
"ticker cases:' See note 30, mupra. Cf. Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 26 N. . 12
(1889) (trade secret rule applied to mechanical patterns).
46. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). The pro-
tection which the courts refuse, the manufacturers themselves have attained by the for-
mation of a guild of apparel manufacturers "to the end that the manufacturers of orig-
inal styles could better protect the fruits of their labor.' Registration of original designs
was required, copying forbidden, and boycotting of non-cooperative retailers provided for.
The court ruled the organization legal under the anti-trust laws, as it did not suppress
competition or prejudice the public interest. Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, 14 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1936), aff'd, 90 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 1st,
1937).
47. See Waring v. NV. D. A. S. Broadcasting Station, Inc., 3W7 Pa. 433, 452, n. 12,
194 Atl. 631, 640 (1937). The availability of copyright or patent protection is one
factor to be considered in determining the presumptive intent to abandon rights. See note
34, supra. But the mere fact that an article is proper for a patent does not prevent unfair
competition protection. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 93 Mass. 452, 458 (1863).
48. Following the same reactionary rule, protection from copying of a new name for
an old song was refused in Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Denton & Haskins Music
Pub. Co., Inc., 259 N. Y. 86, 181 N. E. 57 (1932). The copying vwas clearly an appro-
priation of the fruits of another's labor under the rule in the Intcrnational Arcws case,
and a strong dissent so argued.
49. Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936)
(attempted preservation of exclusive use of the "bank night" scheme) ; Cramp v. Lindsay,
19381
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legal protection."0 Where evidence of ownership is provided by the addition of
the element of form through the reduction of an idea or creation to practice,
the courts have followed the rule of the News case, forbidding the theft of
the very source of a man's profit, even by the use of means unchallenged
per se.51 Furthermore, a recent case, extending to performers the protection
formerly accorded only to the authors of artistic creations, strongly reas,ert-
ed this liberal principle, holding fraud irrelevant and public performance
an abandonment only to non-competitors. 52 Another case extended the appli-
cation of the rule to a situation where no direct competition was involved.53
It would appear, therefore, that while the News case did not have the imme-
diate far-reaching effect that was confidently predicted,"4 neither has it been
so narrowly restricted as was subsequently feared. 5
With regard to news dissemination, whether by newspaper or radio, the
News case has been more uniformly followed.50 One problem created by the
decision, however, requires separate discussion. The court in the News case
drew a sound distinction between the product of the labors of a news gath-
ering agency--collected news; and the source of that product-facts. The
former it protected from commercial rivals; the latter it left free to all. Just
as the trade secret and ticker cases allow all competitors to learn the protected
130 Va. 144, 107 S. E. 679 (1921) (adoption of advertising pamphlet for use with respect
to defendants' identical goods). In the latter case, which contained the element of
reduction to practice through printing of the catalogue, it is perhaps unfortunate that
the court refused to follow the rule of the International News case. The former case,
however, involves the theft of an idea rather than a real "business system," and thus
comes under the rules as to business schemes. See note 26, supra.
50. See page 292, supra.
51. Meccano, Ltd. v. Wagner, 234 Fed. 912 (S. D. Ohio 1916) (attempted competi-
tive sale of copied additional parts to plaintiff's toy sets, at a lower price than that set
by plaintiff); Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F. (2d) 370 (E. D. Pa. 1925), appeal dismissed,
10 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) (sale of cards copied from plaintiffs' for distri-
bution through plaintiffs' vending machines); Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Davis, 209 Fed. 917
(S. D. Ohio 1913) (buying empty tanks specially designed by plaintiff for use in sale
of defendants' gas).
52. Waring v. W. D. A. S. Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. o31
(1937) (enjoining the commercial broadcast of plaintiff's records, which were labeled
"not licensed for Radio Broadcast").
53. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934) (en-
joining sale of a script prepared by Ed 'Wynn for broadcast, and commercial use of the
name "Graham McNamee").
54. See NIMs, UNFAIR COM.PETITION AND TRADE MARKS (3d ed. 1929) 779.
55. See Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 191; Comment
(1930) 14 MINN. L. RE:v 537, 544.
56. Associated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcast Ass'n (D. S. D. 1933) unreported
[for decision see Brief for Petitioners, p. 22, Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. K. Q. V. Broad-
casting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W. D. Pa. 1938)] ; Associated Press v. K. V. 0. S., Inc.,
80 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 299 U. S. 269 (1936)
(preliminary injunction preventing radio stations from broadcasting news items of com-
plainant for so long as such broadcasts would constitute harmful competition),
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information by independent investigation,5 7 so in news cases anyone may
himself go to the source of information.58 Naturally enough there were
efforts following the News case to come within this exception to the rule of
restriction. In one case, where exclusive broadcasting rights to a prize-fight
had been granted one radio company, another made the claim that it intended
to compete by getting tips from the ringside and corroborating them through
its own observers outside the stadium. 9 The issue thus raised was not di-
rectly settled, for the court found that the scheme, on its facts, was impracti-
cable without the use of supplementary information taken from the licensed
broadcast.60 Since the cases had established that broadcasting news is not a
general publication,0 ' and that rival radio stations are competing for profit
even in the absence of direct payment, 0 2 the situation was held clearly analo-
gous to that in the News case. 3
A recent case in a federal district court has raised the problem in more
striking form."4 The Pittsburgh Pirates sold exclusive broadcasting rights
for their baseball games to a commercial sponsor, operating over N.B.C. A
rival broadcasting station, an unsuccessful applicant for this privilege, pro-
ceeded to broadcast similar play by play accounts allegedly made up from the
independent observations of its own observers stationed on land leased by
it outside the ball park.0 5 The licensed companies and the athletic club sued
jointly to enjoin the practice. As in the prize-fight case,00 evidence was pre-
sented to show that defendants could not carry on successful broadcasts
without using prohibited methods of corroborating their observations. 7 They
were accused of pilfering information from the licensed broadcasts; and of
inducing breach of contract by purchasing reports from 1Western Union,
which was licensed to disseminate news to subscribing newspapers only, and
from spectators, whose tickets uniformly stipulated nondisclosure of news
57. See p. 293, supra.
58. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 243 (1918).
59. Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Trans-Radio Press Service, Inc., 165
Misc. 71, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
60. Id. at 74, 300 N. Y. Supp. at 162.
61. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 35S (D. Mass. 1934);
Associated Press v. K. V. 0. S., Inc., 80 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
62. See Waring v. V. D. A. S. Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 455, 194 At]. 631, 641
(1937); cf. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U. S. 591 (1917); Associated Press v.
K. V. 0. S., Inc., 80 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
63. See Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc., v. Trans-Radio Press Service, Inc.,
165 Misc. 71, 73, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159, 161 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
64. Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. K. Q. V. Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W. D.
Pa. 1938).
65. See Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. K. Q. V. Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490,
492 (NV. D. Pa. 1938) ; Brief for Petitioners, p. 5, ibid.
66. Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Trans-Radio Press Service, Inc., 165
Misc. 71, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
67. Mimeographed Findings of Fact No. 30, Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. K. Q. V.
Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W. D. Pa. 1938).
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of the game during its progress.68 These alleged activities are prohibited both
by judicial mandate 0 and by the Federal Communications Act of 1934.70
Their infusion into the case may have had some weight in inducing the court
to grant the injunction, which was phrased in broad terms to include all the
alleged wrongs.71 But the decision was not placed solely on these narrow
grounds.7 2 Relying on the News case, the court held that by its "creation of
the game, its control of the park, and its restriction of the dissemination of
news therefrom," 73 the athletic club gained a property right in the news value
of the contest. Consequently, the granting of exclusive broadcasting rights
was a justified capitalization on the labor and money expended; and a theft
of the product of that labor and expense amounted to unfair competition.
The injunction could have been based entirely on the recognized unfair
practices alleged; and so based, it would have been completely orthodox. 4
But the broader ground employed by the court requires analysis. The deci-
sion is stated in general terms derived from the News case. Yet of the recent
cases with similar facts, one directly held the News case inapplicable ;1 and
the other, though relying on the News case and holding the granting of exclu-
sive broadcasting rights legally justified, expressly left open the question of
whether these rights would be protected from infringement by independent
observation from outside the stadium.70 The situation, moreover, is clearly
distinguishable on its facts from that in the News case. There the injunction
prevented theft of correlated news reports; but it was explicitly stated that
to collect the news by independent investigation was perfectly justified.11 It
is the right to do this very thing that defendants claim to exercise in the
instant case; and what plaintiffs seek to protect is, therefore, not really final
news, but the news value of the event they have created. It has been held
that the mere creation of an event of general interest does not give exclusive
rights to the news value thereof unless the creator can control the sources of
68. See Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. K. Q. V. Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492
(NV. D. Pa. 1938).
69. See Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc., v. Trans-Radio Press Service, Inc.,
165 Misc. 71, 73, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159, 161 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
70. 48 STAT. 1091, 47 U. S. C. § 325a (1934).
71. Preliminary Injunctive Decree, Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. X. Q. V. Broadcast-
ing Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W. D. Pa. 1938).
72. The court assumes defendants' version of its means of obtaining the inforination,
See Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. K. Q. V. Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W. D.
Pa. 1938).
73. Ibid.
74. See notes 69, 70, supra.
75. National Exhibition Co. v. Tele-Flash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488 (S. D. N. Y. 1936)
(a hastily written, poorly reasoned decision, denying the presence of competition. In that
case, moreover, the admission tickets were unrestricted).
76. See Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Trans-Radio Press Service, Inc.,
165 Misc. 71, 74, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159, 162 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
77. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 243 (1918).
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that news.78 Such control is present in the class of cases concerning private
exhibitions. It is exercised by an express or implied stipulation of nondis-
closure attached to the license to use the premises where the exhibition oc-
curs.79 It exists in the instant case with regard to all those actually attending
the games,80 but dearly has no direct application to defendants, who are not
interfering at all with the physical premises. The only effect of the strict
control exercised by the plaintiffs over the admission to its spectacles is to
show a clear intent to confine dissemination of the news.
The case turns on the question of whether this intent, sufficient to gain
legal sanction for exclusive rights within the park,8 ' should operate to extend
the scope of such rights beyond the physical limits controlled by the athletic
club, despite the unequivocal doctrine of the trade secret and Ncws cases
that facts fairly discovered by independent investigation are freely available
to all.8 2 In short the question is whether the courts, though they sanction
limited monopolies of the news value of exhibitions, must deny protection
to the monopoly desired in the instant case because the means used to violate
it were not deceptive.
It would seem that the answer lies in fusing with the doctrine of unfair
competition the principles of the right of privacy. The right of privacy, long
recognized as an attribute of property,8 3 is now gaining recognition as a
generic field of law.84 The more common realm of personal privacy, the
right to be let alone, finds its basis in the principle that the constitutional
privilege of "life" impliedly means the privilege to enjoy life free of unwar-
ranted publicity.8 5 It is limited by the same tests of consensual abandonment
78. See Sports and General Press Agency, Ltd. v. "Our Dogs" Publishing Co., Ltd.
[1916] 2 K. B. 880, 883 (taking of photographs from a point outside the dog show
grounds); Comment (1919) 32 HnAv. L. REv. 566, 567. The case, however, does not
support any unlimited right to photograph from outside the grounds, and the pictures
were actually taken within the grounds on an unrestricted ticket. See Victoria Park
Racing and Recreation Grounds Co., Ltd. v. Taylor, 43 "The Argus" L, Rep. 597, 609
-(High Ct. of Australia, 1937).
79. See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 300 (1907) ; Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 255 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 43 (1882); Sports and General Press
Agency, Ltd., v. "Our Dogs" Publishing Co., Ltd. [1916] 2 K. B. 880, 8,3.
80. The ball club, which owned the premises, took all available steps to restrict dis-
semination of news therefrom. See Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. K. Q. V. Broadcasting
Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (V. D. Pa. 1938).
81. See Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Trans-Radio Press Service, Inc.,
165 Misc. 71, 73, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159, 161 (Sup. Ct. 1937). On the general effect of
intent see note 34, supra.
82. See notes 30, 58, supra.
83. See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 424 (Ch. 1818) ; Prince Albert v. Strange,
2 De Gex & Sm. 652, 695 (Ch. 1849); Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy
(1890) 4 HIAuv. L. REv. 193, 205, 211.
84. See Comment (1938) 33 ILL. L. Rsv. 87, 95.
85. See Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 195, 50 S. E.
68, 69 (1905) ; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 659, 134 S. V. 1076, 1078 (1911) ;
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and public interest analyzed above. 86 Thus a person cannot complain of pub-
licity which he has himself instigated or authorized; and when a man becomes
a public character, he loses his privacy right to the degree that -he is a source
of legitimate news interest.8 7
Though the new right is regarded as dominantly a personal one,88 there
seems to be no reason why it should not be applied also, on parallel princi-
ples of undisturbed enjoyment, to property and business interests. There is
little authority for such an extension of the doctrine, but this may be ex-
plained as the result of inherent judicial hesitation to establish new prece-
dents. Many judges have shown an inclination to protect privacy in the use
of property by granting relief from prying eyes through strained theories
of trespass.8 9 More recently, the holding in at least one case supports exten-
sion of the doctrine ;"O and it has been advocated in several cogently reasoned
dissenting opinions." Perhaps the most important of these was written in
a recent case in the High Court of Australia,0 2 on facts quite similar to those
in the instant situation. Defendants in that case broadcast 'horse races from
a tower outside plaintiff's track. Two strong dissenting opinions argued, on
the basis of privacy, for the requested injunction, invoking principles strik-
ingly like those of unfair competition. 3 It was asserted that though the
common law gives no absolute right of privacy neither does it give an un-
limited license to spy. The fact that a man has a legal privilege to look over
his neighbor's fence does not necessarily imply a further right to 'broadcast
what 'he sees, to his neighbor's damage. It is necessary to balance the right
Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 563, 64 N. E. 442, 450 (1902)
(Gray, dissenting).
86. See p. 293, supra.
87. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 83, at 214, 218; Comment (1938) 33 ILL.
L. REv. 87, 97, n. 67. Commercial use, e.g., of photographs, does not fall within these
exceptions. New York has adopted a special statute regulating such use. N. Y. Civ.
RiGHTs LAw §§ 50, 51.
88. See note 87, supra.
89. Hickman v. Maisey [1900] 1 Q. B. 752 (prolonged use of public highway to ob-
serve race course trials on plaintiff's adjoining land ruled an unnatural use and so a
trespass); The Queen v. Thomas Pratt, 4 El. & Bl. 860 (Q. B. 1855) (using part of
highway solely to interfere with rights of owner on another part of the land) ; Winfield,
Privacy (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 23.
90. Rudolph-Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Pathe News, Inc., 235 App. Div. 774 (N. Y. 1st
Dep't 1932) (memorandum decision) (injunction preventing photographing boxing ex-
hibition from overlooking building sustained).
91. Detroit Baseball Club v. Deppert, 61 Mich. 63, 68, 27 N. W. 856, 858 (1886)
(use of barn roof adjoining ball park as vantage point for a number of people to view
the games at reduced cost) ; Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co., Ltd, v.
Taylor, 43 "The Argus" L. Rep. 597, 602, 607 (High Ct. of Australia, 1937) ; ef. Waring
v. W. D. A. S. Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 456, 194 Atd. 631, 642 (1937).
92. Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co., Ltd, v. Taylor, 43 "The
Argus" L. Rep. 597 (High Ct. of Australia, 1937).
93. Evatt, J., specifically cited International News Service v. Associated Press and
applied its principle to the instant invasion of privacy. Id. at 610.
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to use one's own property as seems to him best against the duty to avoid un-
necessary interference with a neighbor's similar right to put his land to
profitable use.
In a jurisdiction applying rules of unfair competition this line of reason-
ing must carry even more weight. Under liberal doctrines unfair competi-
tion cases very often involve the adjustment of conflicting rights, each legiti-
mate if considered alone.94 Thus in the Pittsburgh Pirates case, the objection
was made that the news value of plaintiff's games takes them out of the
protection of the privacy right, by analogy with the principles stated above
under personal privacy.9 5 Ready answer is afforded by the fact that in this
case the news is the very source of profit, and its exclusive control as against
competitors within the park has already been sanctioned as not contravening
public interest.96 Application of the doctrine of privacy to property would
extend this protection to the case of infringement from without the park.
The troublesome exception to the News case is irrelevant in a consideration
of such an extension. That exception referred to an independent investiga-
tion of generally available facts. 7 The instant case, on the other hand, is
concerned with a private exhibition, restricted by every available means, of
an event itself created by plaintiff's effort and expense. Thus what was in
the News case a mere raw material9s has here become the finished product,
the direct source of profit. With this in mind, it becomes clear that defend-
ants are not really using their own efforts to any great extent, but are tak-
ing as genuine a "free ride" on plaintiffs' labor as did the defendant in the
earlier case. Their "independent effort" consists in taking ingenious advantage
of the fact that plaintiffs have not the physical means fully to carry out their
intent to screen the field from prying eyes.09 Clever piracy of this sort should
not be allowed for the lack of a direct precedent. Unfair competition neces-
sarily covers many types of legal wrong, 0 0 and it is clearly both fair and
94. E.g., in Meyer v. Herwitz, 5 F. (2d) 370, 371 (E. D. Pa. 1925), the court stated
that "the defendant may not, by associating therewith a right which is not denied him,
that of imitating the plaintiff's uncopyrighted cards, appropriate to himself the plaintiff's
system and organization for the purpose of underselling him and appropriating to him-
self profits to which the plaintiff, through his efforts, expenditures and industry, is
entitled."
95. See note 87, supra.
96. See Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Trans-PRadio Press Service, Inc.,
165 Misc. 71, 73, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159, 161 (Sup. CL 1937).
97. See p. 296, mipra.
98. See Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 Fed. 244, 248 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1917) (distinction of facts and gathered news).
99. See Brief for Petitioners, p. 36, Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. F. Q. V. Broadcast-
ing Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (AV. D. Pa. 1938) (if plaintiffs raised their fence, defendants
would resort to a captive balloon!) ; cf. Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Co., Ltd.
v. Taylor, 43 "The Argus" L. Rep. 597, 611 (High Ct. of Australia, 1937).
100. See Comment (1919) 13 ILT.. L. Ray. 708, 717: ". . . it includes the entire field
of infringement in patent law, trademarks, and copyright; the protection of good will,
trade names, and trade secrets; and all undue interferences xith the normal current of
a business enterprise . . ."
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sound to extend to this invasion of privacy the principles of the News case,
which protect exclusive rights for the period necessary to guarantee a fair
return on labor and money expended. 101
The modern law of unfair competition must rest, then, not on any fixed
traditional concepts of certain absolute individual rights, but on a careful
balancing of conflicting rights, according to the dictates of enlightened public
trade policy. Initiative should be encouraged by preserving to the owner
of a lawful business the just reward of ibis efforts and expense so long as
the source of that reward has not become public property either by virtue of
the owner's consent, or because of a public need to avoid endangering free-
dom of competition and the general currency of dynamic ideas. It has been
suggested that the application of such a principle endangers the logical struc-
ture of our legal system since it extends to fields not covered by patent and
copyright statutes protection even greater than those legislative safeguards
afford, and provides to matters within the scope of those laws copyright and
patent protection extending beyond the statutory period.'l 2 This viewpoint
unnecessarily exaggerates the danger. The principle underlying the doctrines
of unfair competition is fundamentally in harmony with patent and copy-
right statutes in that both aim to preserve exclusive rights only so long as is
necessary to ensure a fair return on the effort expended. The decisions go
beyond the existing statutes not so much in principle as in scope. They con-
tain a fuller recognition of the growing need to reach a reasonable balance
between uncurbed competition and stifling monopoly. Of course it is true
that the issues raised in the solution of this problem are often delicate, and
involve complex trade situations which could be more coherently and inclu-
sively treated by legislation. 03 In the absence of such legislation, however,
equity should not hesitate to act. So long as technical maxims are not allowed
to cloud clear analysis of the true issues, so long as the means of misappro-
priation do not prevent recognition of the nature of the right invaded, the
doctrine of unfair competition will remain a sound and flexible weapon in the
eternal struggle ibetween piracy and the law.
101. See note 43, supra.
102. See Comment (1919) 13 1u. L. REv. 708, 719.
103. E.g., the radio-press controversy. See Shapiro, The Press, the Radio anld the
Law (1935) 6 AiR L. REv. 128.
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